Cisco IOS XE SD-WAN Software Packet Filtering Bypass Vulnerability
TL;DR 📌
A medium-severity vulnerability has been identified in Cisco IOS XE SD-WAN Software that allows unauthenticated remote attackers to bypass Layer 3 and Layer 4 traffic filters. This could lead to unauthorized access to network resources. Users are advised to implement workarounds or upgrade to fixed software versions as soon as possible.
What happened 🕵️♂️
A vulnerability in the packet filtering features of Cisco IOS XE SD-WAN Software could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to bypass Layer 3 and Layer 4 traffic filters. This issue arises from improper traffic filtering conditions on affected devices. By sending a crafted packet, an attacker could exploit this vulnerability to inject malicious packets into the network. Proof-of-concept exploit code is available, although there are no known instances of malicious exploitation at this time.
Affected products 🖥️
The following products are affected by this vulnerability:
- Cisco IOS XE Software releases 17.2.1r and later in Controller mode.
- Standalone Cisco IOS XE SD-WAN Software releases:
- 16.9.1 through 16.9.4
- 16.10.1 through 16.10.5
- 16.11.1a
- 16.12.2r through 16.12.4
Devices with SNMP enabled on any SD-WAN Tunnel interface are also vulnerable. If SNMP is not enabled, the device is not affected.
Fixed software 🔧
Upgrade to the first fixed release in your train (or later):
| Release / Product | First Fixed Release | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| 1.1 | Clarified the vulnerable configuration. | |
| 1.0 | Initial public release. | |
| Cisco IOS and IOS XE Software | Not specified |
Workarounds 🧯
To mitigate this vulnerability, users can implement the following workarounds:
- Configure an extended access control list (ACL) to block and allow specific ingress and egress traffic to and from the device.
- Configure a device access policy to block unsolicited SNMP traffic.
These workarounds should be tested in your environment to ensure they do not negatively impact functionality or performance.
Risk in context 🎯
With a CVSS score of 5.3, this vulnerability is rated as Medium severity. The exposure is primarily driven by the fact that it is internet-facing and does not require authentication for exploitation. While the risk is moderate, the potential for unauthorized access to network resources necessitates prompt action.
Fast facts ⚡
- Vulnerability: Packet Filtering Bypass
- CVSS Score: 5.3 (Medium)
- Exploitation: Proof-of-concept code available
- SNMP Requirement: Vulnerable only if SNMP is enabled
- Workarounds: ACL configuration and device access policy adjustments
For leadership 🧭
Executive summary. Devices running affected Cisco IOS XE SD-WAN releases with SNMP enabled on a tunnel interface can have their traffic filtering rules bypassed by an unauthenticated remote attacker, allowing unwanted packets into the network. Proof-of-concept code exists, so affected devices should be checked and mitigated within the next routine change cycle rather than left until the next scheduled upgrade.
Why it matters:
- Affects Cisco IOS XE Software 17.2.1r and later in Controller mode, plus standalone SD-WAN releases from 16.9.1 through 16.12.4, a wide range of in-service SD-WAN deployments.
- Exploitation requires no authentication and only a crafted packet, and the flaw specifically defeats the Layer 3/4 ACLs administrators rely on to segment or restrict traffic.
- The bypass only applies where SNMP is enabled on an SD-WAN tunnel interface, so identifying which devices have SNMP configured there is the key exposure question.
- Proof-of-concept exploit code is already available, increasing the chance of opportunistic probing even though no active exploitation has been reported.
Now / Next / Later:
- Now: Audit SD-WAN devices to identify which have SNMP enabled on any SD-WAN Tunnel interface, since those are the only ones affected.
- Next: On affected devices, apply the extended ACL to control ingress/egress traffic and configure a device access policy to block unsolicited SNMP traffic, testing both in a change window.
- Later: Plan and schedule upgrades to the first fixed release for each affected train, and review whether SNMP needs to be enabled on tunnel interfaces at all going forward.